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With the development of the reform, the enterprise has marched into the credit 
economy times, all kinds of credit such as commercial credit, bank credit, customs 
credit and media credit have begun to be used widely. In the practice of tax in China, 
there has been shortage of credit, so it’s necessary to found the third tax-paying credit 
assessment agencies in the society, which independent to tax government and 
tax-payers, to regular the tax credit market in China. In the practice of tax, because of 
the existence of asymmetry information, non-faithful tax-payers have motion to 
imitate faithful tax-payers. This game relationship between tax-payers and tax 
government is called hidden information and signaling. In this situation how to 
transmit high credit signal to tax government, and how to distinguish tax-payers’ real 
tax credit efficiently is the focus of my research. In the essay, I try to use signaling 
model in practice of tax. First of all, I introduce some knowledge about game theory 
and signaling model, include proposing of the model, the order and finally solution of 
the model. On basis of the knowledge, I put signaling model into practice of 
assessment of tax credit, include series of hypothesis, set up the model and finally 
work up the range in which faithful tax-payers can be distinguished from non-faithful 
tax-payers under perfect Bayesian equilibrium. However, because of the existence of 
asymmetry information, tax-payers may associate with the auditor to attain a higher 
credit rank. In this situation, we also use the method of perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
to propose some feasible solutions including increasing the punishment and prize and 
so on. Finally, to summarize the analysis, I put forward some doable suggestions to 
enhance the construction of tax credit system in China. 
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of incentive under asymmetric information)做出了奠基性的贡献”。具体地说，他
们先后从不对称信息条件下如何设置最优税种入手，研究如何将经济行为主体的
刺激因素置于税收政策的决定和其他财政政策的决策过程中，创造性地提出了
“最优税制理论”（the theory of optimal taxation）。在《最优所得税理论探讨》(An 
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HV 美元（ H LV V> ）；而每个卖者了解他
所卖的汽车的质量，给出低质量汽车的价格为 LP 美元，高质量汽车的价格为 HP
美元（ H LP P> ， L LV P> ， H HV P> ）。假设存在高低两种质量分开的市场，那
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